Looking up in Scotland? Multinationalism, multiculturalism and political elites by Meer, Nasar
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking up in Scotland? Multinationalism, multiculturalism and
political elites
Citation for published version:
Meer, N 2015, 'Looking up in Scotland? Multinationalism, multiculturalism and political elites' Ethnic and
Racial Studies, vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 1477-1496. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2015.1005642
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/01419870.2015.1005642
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Ethnic and Racial Studies
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Ethnic and Racial Studies,
Vol 38, Issue 9 on 18/03/2015, available online:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2015.1005642
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
 
Looking up in Scotland?  
Multinationalism, Multiculturalism and Political Elites  
 
Abstract 
 
At a time when all the political parties of Scotland are trying to establish a persuasive 
vision of the nation, inquiry into where ethnic and racial minorities fit into these debates 
provides one understudied means of bridging literatures on multinationalism and 
multiculturalism.  Focusing especially on the lesser known question of how elite political 
actors are positioning minorities within projects of nation building, this article draws 
upon original empirical data in which three predominant clusters emerge.  The first 
centres on an aspirational pluralism, the second concerns competing ways in which the 
legacy of Scotland’s Empire resonates, and the third points to potential limitations in 
minority claims-making and recognition  The article illustrates how elite political actors 
can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in Scotland can be 
meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too. 
 
Keywords: Scotland; Elites; Nation; Multinationalism; Multiculturalism; Identity; 
Ethnicity
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Introduction
i
 
 
In recent years the constitutional possibilities raised by the separate (though 
related) debates over Scottish nationalism and Scottish Independence have enjoyed 
prominence, both inside and well beyond the borders of the Scotland.  Despite the 2014 
Scottish Independence referendum result, which saw a majority (55%) vote in favour on 
staying in the United Kingdom, the nature and content of the wider constitutional 
settlement remains salient, and all Scottish political parties are engaged in trying to 
establish a persuasive vision of the nation. Where ethnic and racial minorities fit into 
these debates provides one understudied means of bridging literatures on 
multinationalism and multiculturalism.  Focusing especially on the lesser known question 
of how elite political actors are positioning minorities within projects of nation building, 
this article draws upon original empirical data in which three predominant clusters 
emerge.  The first centres on an aspirational pluralism, in so far political elites are less 
inclined – in contrast to counterparts in some other minority nations - to place ethnically 
determined barriers on membership of Scottish nationhood. The second concerns the 
competing ways in which the legacy of Scotland’s place in the British Empire is 
appropriated by actors of different political hues, and so assumes a multiform role.  The 
third cluster points to potential limitations in minority claims-making and recognition, 
especially in terms of formal multi-lingualism and corporate multi-faithism, something 
that may partly be explained by the tension between multinationalism and 
multiculturalism.  The article therefore begins with a discussion of what is understood as 
multinationalism studies and how this may be distilled into debates about 
multiculturalism in Scotland. It then moves to set out the rationale for, and approach to, 
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studying political elites in Scotland, before turning to the empirical data as it is expressed 
in the three clusters of argumentation set out above. The article then moves to consider 
how elite political actors can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to nationhood in 
Scotland can be meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too. 
 
Multinationalism Studies   
 
The study of multinationalism has generated a wide-ranging literature that spans 
both theoretical and empirical inquiry on ideal and existing political settlements (Peleg, 
2007). Thematically concerned with multi-level governance, constitutional devolution 
and federalism, what we might term multinationalism studies also foregrounds questions 
of identity and citizenship, and so can constitute a rich sub-field of comparative politics; 
one that is distinct (though obviously related to) the study of territorial politics (McEwen 
et al, 2012).  Typically focused on ‘states that have restructured themselves to 
accommodate significant sub-state nationalist movements’ (Kymlicka. 2011: 282), 
multinationalism studies especially explores the character and self-identity of ‘nested’ 
nations which bear distinguishing histories and features of contemporary civil-society.  
 
There are conceivably a number of important challenges to this framing.
 
These may 
include the extent to which ‘multinationalism’ is the most appropriate appellation or best 
analytical category, and that it obscures multi-level dynamics.  There is moreover 
disagreement over how we should conceptualise the ways collective identities are 
mobilised, and more broadly how boundaries based upon something greater than territory 
(e.g., citizenship entitlements for ethnic diaspora) need to offer a more elaborate ethical 
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rationale.  Some of these issues rehearse arguments found in the nationalism studies 
literature; others are incorporated from disputes in the citizenship literature.  
 
The tension relevant for this paper concerns how multinationalism can relate to 
multiculturalist perspectives.  The latter, though used differently across varying contexts, 
has more broadly been focused on the accommodation and integration of migrant and 
post-migrant groups typically termed ‘ethnic minorities’.  To confuse matters 
multiculturalism has also taken in multinational questions e.g., multiculturalist Canada 
focused from the outset on constitutional and land issues too.  We might therefore 
summarise that multiculturalism can simultaneously describe the political 
accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined first 
and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity, and, additionally but more controversially, 
by reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality, aboriginality, or 
religion.  (Modood and Meer, 2013: 113). 
 
As a set of political positions, the tension between multinationalism and multiculturalism 
turns on how ‘for minority nations, the sustainability of their projects in the context of 
growing immigration depends on immigrants making a conscious choice to affiliate 
themselves with that national project’ (Kymlicka, 2011: 294).  Some try to overcome the 
tension by stating that multinational and multicultural perspectives can be mutually 
reinforcing, with each perspective contesting notions of monocultural nation-states, and 
encouraging cultural minority formation, ‘linking these to social equality and protection 
from discrimination’ (Castles, 2000: 5).  Thus several accounts understand the two 
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approaches as co-constituting in so far as one creates space for the other (Crick, 2007, 
2009); perhaps illustrated in Britain by the ways in which ‘present immigrant minorities 
easily fit into…the diversity of its four nations’ (Parekh, 2009: 37).   Yet in a number of 
cases these perspectives have not come together as predicted, or have come to imply 
problematic hierarchies within federal settlements where established nations set the terms 
of inclusion for more recent ethnic minorities (Foweraker and Landman, 2000).  
Signalling a revision of an earlier hypothesis, that multinationalism and multiculturalism 
would indeed come together, Kymlicka (2011: 289) now recognises that ‘countries with 
an inherited ethos of accommodation in relation to old minorities are not predestined to 
be inclusive of new minorities – there is no inherent tendency for the former to spill over 
to the latter (emphasis added)’.  Indeed, he continues, in many cases we are finding that 
‘practises of multinational citizenship are privileged over, and preclude, the fair inclusion 
of immigrants’ (ibid).    
 
Multiculturalism in Scotland 
At least one possible exception to Kymlicka’s reading is the Scotland.  While 
undoubtedly affected by the advancing and receding tides of British multiculturalism 
(Hussain and Miller, 2006: 31),’ Scotland has long been described as a ‘stateless nation’, 
at least since the 1707 Acts of Union moved parliamentary sovereignty Westminster
ii
. 
This union, however, was only ever partial in that ‘it did not take away from Scotland any 
of the major institutions of civic life’ (Patterson, 2000: 46). It did not dissolve civil-
society, or the independence of the Church of Scotland, systems of law, education, or 
local governance. It was instead ‘an amalgamation of Parliaments…not an absorption of 
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Scotland into England’ (ibid) (cf Pittock, 2012: 13).  This is perhaps why the 
characterisation of Scotland as a ‘stateless nation’ was always more contentious than 
might be implied, and the existence of a significant institutional fabric in social and 
political life offers one answer to Luis Moreno’s (2006) quandary as to how ‘strong 
Scottishness seemed to combine with a weaker popular quest for achieving institutional 
self-government as compared with Catalans’ mobilisation in the late 1970s’.  In either 
case, through processes of legal and political devolution facilitated through the Scotland 
Act (1998) which re-established a Scottish parliament, ‘after almost 300 years [it] means 
that Scotland is no longer stateless’ (McCrone, 2001: 1).  What remains underexplored 
from a multiculturalist perspective, ‘the extent to which ethnicity continues to shape their 
own view of Scottish nationalism and national identity (Mycock, 2012: 65)’.  
 
Even though questions of multinationalism and multiculturalism in Scotland ‘have 
managed to fire past each other’ (McCrone, 2002: 304), there is a prevailing assumption 
that a ‘civic’ and inclusive ‘big tent’ national identity is a prevailing aspiration (Keating, 
2009 and cf Hepburn and Rosie, 2014).  Yet it remains to be ascertained as to where 
ethnic and racial minorities, sometimes dubbed the ‘new Scots’, might come to rest in 
debates about nationalist politics, identity and contemporary nationhood more broadly. 
 
It has been argued that this may result from the comparatively smaller presence of such 
groups in Scotland
iii
, or that such minorities have not become politicised in a manner 
comparable to England (McCrone, 2001: 171), and certainly that they have not been 
racialized in the same way (Miles, 1986). Since ‘all civic and democratic cultures are 
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inevitably embedded into specific ethno-national and religious histories’ (Bader, 2005: 
169), however, Scotland cannot rely on the view that in merely promoting itself as 
‘impeccably civic’ (Keating, 2009: 217) it will be able to secure a future in which ethnic 
and racial minorities are included.  
 
Bridging literatures on migration related minority ‘difference’ (i.e., multiculturalism) 
with those concerning nationalism, and drawing on primary research interviews with 
Scottish politicians from across the spectrum, this article elaborates on the ways in which 
ideas of a Scottish nationhood are being configured according to specific agendas of 
equality and non-discrimination, existing church-settlements, prevailing notions of ‘civic’ 
participation and inclusion, and implicit norms of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ minority 
claims-making, amongst other things. Before proceeding, however, a fuller 
methodological rationale needs to be set out, and this is what we turn to next.   
 
 
Why political elites in Scotland? 
 
It is said that since devolution ‘a distinct Scottish political class has emerged, with its 
own career trajectory separate from the UK one’ (Keating and Cairney, 2006: 56). 
Interestingly, in their study Keating and Cairney find that this does not so much mark a 
radical break with what has gone before, rather ‘devolution has accelerated the trend 
towards professional middle class leadership’ (ibid) .  Leith and Soule (2012) too explore 
the emergence of an elite political class in Scotland. They observe, for example, that 
while elite political actors ‘present an inclusive sense of identity that is not predicated on 
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any sense of birth, ethnicity or history’ (ibid. 148), this contrasts with mass perception 
which conceives the ‘Scottish nation as having much firmer and more distinct boundaries 
in terms of membership’ (ibid. 149).   
 
The nature and extent of this possible divergence is explored further below, what is 
important to register here is that with the exception of these few accounts the study of 
elite political actors in Scotland is relatively sparse, but is otherwise consistent with a 
broader tendency where social and political scientists ‘too rarely ‘study up’’ (Ostrander, 
1995: 133 ).  There are important methodological reasons for this, not least obstacles 
centring on researcher access, yet the notion that elites matter is commonplace within the 
social and political sciences, and in so far as ‘their undeniable influence’ warrants 
consideration (Leith and Soule, 2012: 122), empirical inquiry might draw on at least two 
rich veins of literature in democratic theory (Plamenatz, 1973) and nationalism studies 
(Gellner, 1983).  While neither is a perfect fit, we might search for an idea of institutional 
opportunities amongst those typically associated with behaviourist traditions; something that 
flourished for a period in North American political sociology.  This saw both Dahl’s (1961) 
Who Governs? and Mill’s The Power Elite employ methods that focused on the behaviour of 
a relatively small number of actors in particular political situations. While these authors 
profoundly disagreed in their understanding and analyses of political systems, they had in 
common the view that ‘the politically active elites in a modern democracy are…only the tip 
of what appears in national parliaments’ (Goodwin, 1987: 226).  The wider body of elites in 
their account was populated by ‘politics facilitating occupations’ (King, 1980 quoted in 
Keating and Cairney, 2006: 45). These include journalists, lobbyists, barristers and 
financiers, amongst others, and are precisely some of the elites who emerge in more diffuse 
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conceptions envisaged in nationalism studies literatures, some of which maintains that 
‘cultures and politics are forged by small minorities, usually by one kind of elites or other’ 
(Smith, 2008: 6). Were we to assess the normative premises of such views we would 
inevitably encounter a dense literature elaborating the continuing disputes over the creation 
of nations, national identities, and their relationship to each other and to non-rational 
‘intuitive’ and ‘emotional’ pulls of ancestries and cultures, and so forth. Chief amongst these: 
whether or not ‘nations’ are social and political formations that developed in the proliferation 
of modern states from the 17th and 18th centuries onwards , or whether they are tied to 
historical formations – or ‘core ethnies’ - bearing an older pedigree that may be obscured by 
a modernist focus . These tensions are relevant because while the current focus is a more 
future oriented one, ‘the debris of history [remain]a source of building materials for 
discretionary construction by current history making entrepreneurs’ (Hussain and Miller, 
2006: 121).  Indeed we know that ‘elites in Scotland are…trying to harness an already 
significant level of national attachment’ (Leith and Soule, 2012: 122), and we are 
precisely interested in the ways in which some political elites are imagining Scottish 
nationhood vis-à-vis ethnic and racial minorities. Here Leith and Soule (2012: 121-2) 
take the view that political elites in Scotland “invite the masses into history’ (Nairn, 
1997: 340), and they maintain that elites do so in a language that connects elite and mass 
ideas of what the ‘nation’ is.  In contemporary Scotland’, they continue, ‘everyday 
politics is a situation of contending elites who seek to construct a specific sense of 
national identity’ (ibid). 
 
It is important however not to overstate this, for we should be reject the assumption that 
national identities in Scotland are marshalled in a purely party-political fashion.  
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McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) have repeatedly established that there is no linear 
relationship (running in either direction) between self-identification as Scottish and an 
aspiration for greater national self-determination (either in terms of constitutional 
arrangements for greater devolution or indeed independence). Hence if ‘one does the 
survey equivalent of hitting people over the head with a blunt instrument and forces them 
to choose just one national identity’ (Bechhofer and McCrone, 2009: 9), it still remains 
that case that we encounter only a ‘weak’ association between national identity and 
devolution, a tendency that remains true of those deemed ‘exclusive Scots’ (who self-
define as Scottish and not British). These findings are re-iterated in Bond and Rosie’s 
(2010) conclusion that although the prioritisations of one or other national identities can 
be related to likely electoral choices, the tendency is one of a ‘non-alignment’ (ibid. 96).   
 
We might further add that since the Scottish National Party (SNP) has been in power with 
an unexpected overall Parliamentary majority following the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary 
election, the appeal of full independence has not prevailed. Of course this was no longer a 
theoretical question. The SNP’s victory allowed them to honour their manifesto pledge to 
negotiate with Westminster to hold an independence referendum. This took place on 18 
September 2014 and showed that electoral support (expressed in voting patterns) for the 
Scottish Nationalist Party was not matched by support for the constitutional 
independence of Scotland. With an electoral turn out of nearly 85% (the highest in any 
election in the UK since the 1950s) over 55% voted against Independence.  While post-
referendum analyses are still being undertaken, a Lord Ashcroft opinion poll carried out 
on 18-19
th
 September is useful indicator of preferences. What is especially relevant for 
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our discussion is that with a sample of over 2000 respondents it showed that 20% of SNP 
supporters were unlikely to vote for independence.   This reiterates why we should avoid 
the category error of trying either to equate Scottish nationalism with - or principally 
understand it through - the premier nationalist party.   Moreover, the campaign in favour 
of independence has had the support of another party represented in the Scottish 
Parliament, the Scottish Greens, as well as all of the independent Members (the late 
Margo MacDonald, Jean Urquhart, John Finnie, and Bill Walker). 
 
While this is not to deny that ‘nationalists are [most] successful when they capture the 
‘nation’ for their own political project’ (McCrone, 2001: 177), in the case of Scotland it 
does not need to be about independence alone. It is precisely because political elites of all 
hues are reaching for some ownership of nationalism in Scotland that makes the topic 
especially interesting (the unionist parties in Scotland are thus named Scottish Labour, 
Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Liberal Democrats, etc).  The tendency of course is to 
assume that the independents are the only nationalists and so ignore how all  y 
appropriate the nation and configure Scottishness to their respective policy projects.    
   
In the next sections I outline three political themes that emerge from the interview data 
with Scottish MSPs. In total 21 interviews were undertaken with members of the Scottish 
Parliament (out of a possible 129 members), between March and November 2012 in their 
Parliamentary offices in Holyrood.  As outlined in Table 1 a gender balance was sought 
and achieved for the two parties with the largest number of Parliamentarians: 4 male and 
4 female each for the Scottish National Party and Scottish Labour, out of a total number 
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of 65 and 37 respectively.  This was less successful with the 2 Conservative respondents 
(2 male out of a possible 15), 2 male Liberal Democrat respondents (out of a possible 5), 
and 1 Green respondent (out of a possible 2) (here the gender of the interviewee is not 
cited as it would easily identify the respondent since there is 1 male and 1 female Scottish 
Green Party representative in the Scottish Parliament).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Political Party 
 
Male Female Total 
Scottish Labour Party 4 4 8 
Scottish National Party 4 4 8 
Scottish Conservative Party 2 1 3 
Scottish Liberal Democrats 2 0 2 
Scottish Green Party * * 1 
Total 12 9 22 
 
 
As a sample the number of interviewees are just short a fifth and an additional set of 
interviews (11 in total) were conducted with journalists, civil society actors and 
intellectuals deemed to be in ‘politics facilitating occupations’ (King, 1980 quoted in 
Keating and Cairney, 2006: 45). The latter were especially instructive during the early 
stages of the research, and the discussion here is principally focused on the parliamentary 
elites who remain understudied in the literature in minorities and nationhood in Scotland. 
It is important to bear in mind that these are not intended to be a statistically 
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representative number but instead a meaningful inclusion of people who have featured in 
debates about and/or are relevant to the topic more broadly. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Aspirational Pluralism  
 
 
The historian Tom Devine has proposed that we can understand the incremental self-
confidence expressed by political elites in Scotland as an ‘aspirational nationalism’ 
(quoted in Goursoyanni, 2012: 63). This he allies to a broader social transformation and 
cultural renaissance that has accompanied both devolution and the shift to a service based 
economy.   A key question for our discussion is whether this also includes an aspiration 
for pluralism?  Here there is evidence of a consensus across unionists and nationalists that 
a project of diverse nation building is underway.  Below are four expressions of this, two 
from unionist (Scottish Labour and Scottish Liberal Democrats) and two from nationalist 
(Scottish National Party and Scottish Greens) parliamentarians. Two frames are 
especially evident.  The first gains purchase from Scotland’s historical multinational 
diversity and is expressed in the following two quotations. 
Occupation Male Female Total 
Academic 2 1 3 
Civil Servant 1 1 2 
Civil Society Actor 1 2 3 
Journalist 2 1 3 
Total 6 5 11 
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If you’re in Scotland, or you’re in Wales, you know, it’s abundantly clear.  Because 
you’re in a small part of Britain, the smaller nations within Britain, it’s very clear that 
Britain is a union of nations.  It’s inherently a multinational, multiethnic, multilingual, 
multicultural entity.  It can’t be anything else.  (Scottish Green Party MSP [H1]). 
 
If you read down through Scotland's history we have a fairly, I think, proud tradition of 
assimilating waves of different groups in a way that has sustained a population in many 
communities.  And I think that’s led to a far more diverse and vibrant and interesting 
cultural mix…. (Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP [M1]) 
 
 
The second frame is more active in so far as Scottish nationalism, it is claimed by both 
nationalist and unionist political elites, has been cast in an inclusive mould, not least by 
these MSP’s respective parties.   
 
 
I suppose, without patting ourselves on the back too much, this is to the credit of the 
Scottish parliament.  And, I mean, I say Labour and SNP, I’m not actually saying that the 
other parties have dissented from this, but they dominate Scottish politics to such an 
extent that it’s what they do that’s been decisive in these areas.  So, you know, that 
probably sounds a bit complacent, but I do think that we’ve had a more positive record 
than, you know, both Labour and Conservative in England (Scottish Labour Party MSP 
[T1]).  
 
 
So, we’ve captured nationalism and made it something positive, and made it civic, so 
that’s been, you know, eight decades worth of work.  It doesn’t happen overnight.  […] If 
you don’t have this alternative nationalism, national movement, national political party 
that a nationalist might be civic, then the EDLs of the world, and the BNPs and the 
National Fronts, they fill that void….  (Scottish National Party MSP [E1]). 
 
Each testimony illustrates the nebulous ways in which elite political actors understand the 
function of nationhood.   Beginning with the first, to place Scotland’s diversity within a 
historical register of multinationalsm assumes that this has served as a sort of 
prophylactic against exclusivity. This is a hypothesis that can be partially tested. 
Surveying the attitudes of Scottish majorities to claims-making by minorities on 
nationhood in Scotland, McCrone and Bechhofer (2010: 922, 937) point to a small but 
consistent ‘ethnic penalty’ that reveals itself as marginally more in Scotland than in 
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England, such that ‘‘Scottish’ is possibly more likely to equate to ‘being white’’.  As they 
discuss, residence in Scotland is deemed a weak claim on national identity, but when 
markers such as accent are added, ‘between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of people accept 
the claim, but introducing parentage, which implies a blood link, produces a further big 
increase in acceptance’ (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2010: 937).  What should we make of 
this?  It certainly challenges the prevalent view amongst political elites that ‘there’s not a 
sort of idea amongst Scottish people that you have to be white and, you know, in order to 
be Scottish’ (Conservative MSP [P2]).  
 
While the marginally higher rejection rates towards non-white in Scotland compared with 
England is concerning, the authors argue that it is important not to exeptionalise Scottish 
attitudes, for while they are slightly more exclusionary than English attitudes, they are 
not radically so.  Interestingly, in their follow up study, Bechhofer and McCrone (2012: 
1364) found a closer pattern between England and Scotland when they looked to see 
whether national identity ‘discriminates in terms of judging claims’, something 
statistically affected by levels of education or and age. Either way, these findings need to 
be understood alongside ways in which minorities in Scotland are more likely than their 
counterparts in England to appropriate hyphenating self-defined identity categories e.g., 
Scottish-Pakistani. This is a well-established trend that political elites sometimes bring 
into support their view that Scottishness is an open identity. One respondent describes 
this in the following terms:   
…there’s something in that Scottishness, and a separate Scottish identity, or nationalism 
[that] is not about choosing one identity over the other, and maybe identity can be multi-
layered, can be fluid, and can exist cohesively, rather than be juxtaposed, and constantly 
in conflict with one another (SNP MSP [A1]).  
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This is a well-established trend in self-identification, our understanding of which was 
profoundly deepened in Hussain and Miller’s (2006: 168) work. The latter observe that 
‘[b]ecause spatial [territorial] identities are not the primary identities for a majority of 
[Scottish] Pakistanis; they find it easier to adopt a Scottish identity’. Other smaller scale 
studies open up lines of inquiry that broadly show continuities in this trajectory, which is 
partly why McCrone and Bechhofer (2010: 926) have argued that ‘being Scottish may be 
thought of as an inclusive club with a low entry tariff’, a kind of ‘‘Big tent’ Scottishness’ 
where ‘everyone living in the country has a claim’.  The important aspect here is the 
subjective confidence and willingness amongst minorities to stake such a claim. 
 
What, however, of the second view that political elites have actively steered Scottish 
nationhood in a more inclusive direction, what Reicher and Hopkins (2001: 92) quote one 
SNP Member of Parliament as naming: ‘a tartan in which so many different, brightly 
coloured parts of the whole merge together as a pattern.’  We might here point to political 
speeches e.g., Alex Salmond has previously stated, and subsequently reinforced, that 
‘’Scotland is not Quebec… the linguistic and ethnic basis [of Quebec] nationalism is a 
two-edged sword… we [in Scotland] follow that path of civic nationalism’ (Salmond, 
1995 quoted in Brubaker, 2004). Or we might highlight policy references not to ‘Scottish 
people’ but to ‘all the people of Scotland’. Indeed the white paper Scotland’s Future 
(2013), which set out the Scottish Government’s case for Independence, insists that ‘a 
commitment to multicultural Scotland will be a cornerstone of the nation on 
independence’ (ibid. 271).   
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In many respects what is most interesting is that this is a self-conscious goal amongst 
political elites, because it distinguishes Scotland from comparable autonomy seeking 
nations.  Of course there is an instrumental political logic at play, in so far as political 
elites ‘have a powerful incentive to recruit immigrants to their national projects, both to 
disprove charges of ethnic exclusion and to build internal consensus’ (Kymlicka, 2011: 
294).  This would seem self-evident. ‘Better in terms of realpolitik to draw the boundary 
around as many as possible; better to have them inside the tent than out of it if one was 
trying to govern the kingdom’ (McCrone, 2001: 178).  Yet some other minority nations 
have shown a marked inability amongst elite political actors to overcome this.  As one 
puts it: 
If you live and work in Scotland, you’re a Scot, and if you want to be....  You need to 
want to be part of it.  We can’t bully people into being Scottish if they don’t want to 
be, you know?  (SNP MSP [L1]).   
 
Scottish political elites therefore express their nationalism as a ‘political’ and not ‘social’ 
matter, and certainly not as a matter of blood and soil. While the distinction between 
‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism has already been identified as problematic, it makes sense 
why the late Bashir Ahmed, Scotland’s first ethnic minority MSP, could confidently 
state: ‘it isn't important where you come from, what matters is where we are going 
together as a nation’ (quoted in Salmond, 2009). Either way, historical experience self-
evidently casts a shadow over contemporary expressions of nationhood in nearly all 
cases, and it is to this in relation to Scotland that we now turn.    
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Expeditionary Proteophilia 
 
 
Scottish political elites frequently invoke experiences of Empire and, allied but 
also parallel to, the history of Scotland as an emigrant sending nation in their discussion 
of pluralism. The relevant question for our discussion is how these narratives are 
assembled.  Tom Devine, for example, has complained that ‘between 1936 and 2003, 
there was no academic analysis of Scotland’s role in the British Empire’ (quoted in 
Goursoyanni, 2012: 61).  As a consequence, he maintains, Scottish public discourse has 
‘suffered from amnesia on that’ (ibid).  This a view shared by a prominent intellectual, 
who points to ‘victimhood works’ that have created a ‘chip on the shoulder, you know, 
Scotland as victim…. because the nation’s history was not really taught in schools, or at 
least until very recently’ (Academic [K1]). 
 
In putting it in these terms the respondent is making the significant point that the Scottish 
story, just as British one, is ‘bursting with Skeletons’ (Marquand, 2009).  Throughout 
various cycles of British expansionism the sons and daughters of Scotland made up its 
military and civilian ranks in copious number.  Devine (2003: 251) has set himself the 
task of elaborating how in the most profitable parts of the East Indian Trading Company, 
roughly half of the accountants and officer cadets were Scottish. In the words of the third 
Earl of Rosebery, this relationship ‘Scotticised India and Orientalised Scotland’ (quoted 
in Devine, 2003: 126). Indeed from the middle of the nineteenth century, the British Raj 
system was created under a Scottish Governor (General James Dalhousie), while 
elsewhere the Scot Charles James Napier effectively annexed the Sind province (a large 
part of modern Pakistan). By the mid-nineteenth century, when one in ten of the British 
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population was Scottish, one third to a quarter of the civil service elite grade of the East 
India Company was Scottish.‘[A]s late as 1928, the Chief of the Imperial and Indian 
General Staffs were both Scots’ (Pittock, 2008: 9), while the hymns of war ‘Scotland the 
Brave’ and later ‘Flower of Scotland’iv were appropriated as popular national anthems 
(McCrone, 2001: 158).    
 
What is especially interesting for our discussion is the tension Mycock (2010: 351) 
describes over the ways in which ‘national narratives must remain largely positive and 
not dwell on the imperial sins of the past’.  How then is Scotland’s role in the Empire, 
and the historical impact this has had upon various interconnected spheres, negotiated by 
Scottish elites?  One prevailing trope is what we could describe as an expeditionary 
proteophilia – by this I mean an appetite for diversity born of searching it out over the 
centuries.  This is demonstrated in the following two quotations from unionist and 
nationalist political actors respectively: 
I mean, we've always been an outward looking society; Scots have traditionally had 
no inhibitions about setting forth usually to the, kind of, wettest, windiest parts of 
the world.  [...]  The Hudson Bay Company exploration, North West Passage, the 
Antarctic Whaling Fleet, none of those would have happened or been sustained 
without Orcadians very much in the mix.  I think the more outward looking you 
are, the more prepared you are to go out and experience different cultures and 
societies; the more receptive probably your community is to that reverse process 
(Liberal Democrat MSP [O1]).  
 
Scottish people have a recognition of their part in the British empire, and that when 
you have been part of an empire, and part of the Commonwealth as well, that you 
are part of a world society, and that you have a responsibility for history.   So we 
don't see people, certainly not in the biggest population which would be the 
Pakistani population, we don't see them as being different to us other than, you 
know, they're all part of the Commonwealth (SNP MSP [Q1]).   
 
 
It is evident that each focuses on the positive inheritance of Empire, much as Mycock 
predicts, yet it is also intriguing to note that neither unionist nor nationalist MSP refuses 
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ownership of Empire. There is moreover a persistently ambiguous tendency for recalling 
Empire and de-colonisation in Scottish politics, for it is something that taps into a 
sociological contradiction.  This is reported by Hussein and Miller’s (2006: 16) that it is 
common to hear Scottish ethnic minorities maintain that ‘Scots understand colonialism-
from their past history they understand what ethnic minorities feel’. It is reminiscent of 
the late Bernie Grant MP, one of the first ethnic minority candidates elected to the post-
war Parliament, who insisted that he would refer to himself as British because ‘it includes 
other oppressed peoples, like the Welsh or the Scots. It would stick in my throat to call 
myself English (quoted in Paxman, 1999: 74).  Yet the ambiguities of recalling Empire is 
so multiform is that it can service the argument of the SNP’s Angus Robertson MP 
(2010: 22), who uses a post-colonial framing in arguing that ‘there was a time when 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, and United States were all run from London.  They are all 
now wealthier per person than the economically centralised UK.  And none of these 
nations would let London decide what is best for them today’.  In this reading partners in 
Empire become the objects of Empire.  
 
It is a tension has not gone unnoticed amongst critics who complain that ‘nationalists 
declare themselves victims of colonialism, conveniently forgetting how many of them 
strutted around the colonies barking orders at the natives and relishing their sundowners’ 
(Alibhai-Brown, 2002: 45).  So there is certainly something in how empire ‘complicates 
post-colonial dimensions of secessionist nationalist discourses’ (Mycock, 2010: 350); 
specifically in highlighting a ‘common imperial experience’ (ibid.). What is especially 
interesting is how this can harnesses imperial history to make a pro-immigration account.   
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Do we want to be part of the world?  Absolutely.  Is our outlook international?  
Yes, it should be.  That’s very much, I think, Britain’s approach to these things too.  
Good gosh, you can’t have Britain’s history and not be that.  So why have very 
restrictive immigration policies in that, particularly in that kind of area? (Liberal 
Democrat [R1])  
 
 
In different ways then such readings are competing to select ‘from all that has gone 
before that which is distinctive, ‘truly ours’, and thereby to mark out a unique, shared 
destiny’ (Smith, 1998: 43).  While this is in part a historical activity it has observable 
contemporary implications, and it is to this that we now turn. 
 
 
Boundaries for Integration 
 
 
Kymlicka (2011: 284) has argued that multinational settlements are often 
‘provisional’ in their accommodation of ethnic minority claims, suggesting there is often 
a dissonance between the reasonable aspiration of minorities and the degree of willing 
accommodation by states. There is a tangible expression of this tension in Scotland.  
Political elites frequently point to a number of boundaries for ensuring integration and 
pursuing unity. Two examples include the question of multi-lingualism and multi-
faithism. Taking the issue of language first, the national languages of Scotland include 
Scottish Gaelic, of which there are approximately sixty thousand speakers and which has 
seen important advances in its recognition.  This includes the Gaelic Language (Scotland) 
Act 2005 which created the Bòrd na Gàidhlig, a body charged with ‘securing the status of 
the Gaelic language as an official language of Scotland commanding equal respect to the 
English language’v. Amongst other rationales put forward is that ‘Gaelic is…an element 
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of Scottishness because it's not spoken anywhere else’ (Academic [U1]).  Despite this 
recognition it is clear that in contrast to other nations, ‘the language tariff which people 
have to pay to be ‘Scots’ has been low to the point of non-existent’ (McCrone, 2001: 
177), and so allows Scottish nationalism to be more than ‘protecting a cultural past under 
threat’ (ibid. 50 cf Bechhofer and McCrone, 2014). Yet when the question is raised of 
bringing other languages into the fold, which are more frequently spoken and appear to 
be taking on distinctive Scottish forms in terms of content and dialect, there is a 
consensus amongst respondents that Scottish Urdu and Scottish Punjabi could not 
warrant a status as one of Scotland’s national languages.  A typical summation, one that 
actually shares much with nationalist responses, is put forward by a conservative MSP:  
Gallic has a privileged position because of the heritage and the desire to preserve the 
culture and the language so it’s always going to get special treatment. As far as the 
rest is concerned I, by and large, think that we should be looking to integrate. Let’s 
not get into this situation where there are sectioned-off communities who can’t 
communicate with people out with their own immediate society, I think that’s very 
dangerous (Conservative MSP [V1]). 
 
 
In this assessment, historical multilingualism is a feature of the national identity whereas 
migrant languages are potentially, but not necessarily, fragmentary. This does not need to 
be illustrated further as there was a consistency (though softer language was used by 
other respondents). Whether or not political elites favoured or opposed the recognition of 
Gaelic (some respondents argued it was a and not the national language), in the view that 
recognising further languages could be divisive.
vi
  Of course this is precisely what some 
authors argue will leave minorities feeling ‘left out [when] the majority understand the 
polity as an expression of their nation, or agreed purpose, whatever it may be’  (Taylor, 
2001: 123).     
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A more charged illustration, however, concerns the prospects for religious pluralism, 
especially corporate recognition, anything up to how ‘the Irish Catholics secured various 
gains as part of a settlement’ (Academic [U1]). The settlement being referred to emerges 
through a period of Catholic Emancipation in Scotland, most clearly symbolised by the 
restoration in 1878 of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Scotland (McCrone, 2001). 
A synopsis of responses are quoted here, and which centres on the issue of parity for the 
state funding of faith schools to minority religions in addition to Protestant and Catholic 
groups:   
That’s a bit of a controversial topic actually.  I personally don’t think it’s a great 
thing.  […] I just don’t think they’re particularly helpful in this day and age (SNP 
MSP [A1]).  
 
I think the scars of the, kind of, sectarian divide we've had are there and probably 
more of the focus of attention in terms of things that we need to resolve (Liberal 
Democrat MSP [R1]). 
 
I think it would be extremely depressing to think that in 50 or 60 years’ time, 
Muslims were no more integrated than that.  There remain serious problems in terms 
of sectarianism and attitudes and prejudices against the Catholic community and 
between the Catholic community and what you might call Protestants but if we 
repeated those mistakes in terms of other ethnic groups and other religions, I think 
that would be very depressing (Green [H1]).   
 
But I’m not keen on that, you know… I still don’t like too much separation because I 
think you need to respect each other while talking to each other and being engaged 
with each other, so I suppose in that sense I’m not really an enthusiast for Catholic 
schools, but yet I’m not going to stand up and try and abolish them because… 
(Labour [U1]) 
 
 
There are some very good reasons to be cautious about seeking to mirror one religion 
settlement in the present with something from the past, and it must be stressed that all 
respondents were positive (often very positive) about the fact of religious pluralism in 
Scotland.  What is interesting in these responses, however, is how each frames the 
question of formally recognizing religious pluralism – as opposed to the fact of religious 
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pluralism at large - within a register of sectarianism. There is a lively debate over the 
form and scale of sectarianism in Scotland (Raab and Holligan, 2012), but in most 
instances this has centered on enmity and discrimination between Scottish Protestants and 
Scottish Catholics, something that has given rise to recent Government initiatives through 
legislation such as the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012.   
The danger is that newer religious minorities are being asked to integrate into existing 
configurations reproduces certain hierarchies, something recognized by Hussain and 
Miller’s (2006) observation that ‘faith-based schooling has many critics, but they [critics] 
are at once reluctant to dismantle the existing system of Catholic schools yet reluctant to 
set up a system of Muslim schools’.  The clear danger for newer religious minority 
claims-making is that because it is framed by political elites within a register of historical 
sectarianism, rather than according to its own dynamics.  The latter would preferably 
occur within a ‘democratic discourse, which makes explicit the grounds on which 
proposals are linked to identities and hence opens up space for debate and alternatives’ 
(Reicher et al 2005: 636).  In many respects then this returns to tension between 
multinationalism and multiculturalism discussed at the outset, in so far as there is a 
danger that the sustainability of minority national projects in conditions of ethnic 
diversity places the two diversities into a hierarchy that is limiting for the latter.   
Conclusions 
This article has considered how elite political actors are locating minorities within 
projects of nation building under conditions of multinationalism and multiculturalism.  
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Taken together it shows how these actors can play a vital role in ensuring that appeals to 
nationhood in Scotland can meaningfully calibrated to include minorities too. At a time 
when all Scottish political parties are jockeying over a vision for the nation, the article 
uses original empirical data to show the emergence of the three predominant clusters: an 
aspirational pluralism, a multiform appropriation of Empire, and potential limitations in 
minority claims-making and recognition. While it is certainly the case, as Kymlicka 
(2011: 289) recognises, that ‘countries with an inherited ethos of accommodation in 
relation to old minorities are not predestined to be inclusive of new minorities’, Scotland 
is not a textbook expression of this.  Not only is the tension less stark than in some other 
cases,  but what is especially interesting is that there is also a strong and unambiguous 
trend not only among majorities, but among ethnic minorities, in identifying themselves 
with the nation (either as Scottish only, or Scottish-British, or Scottish plus something 
else). The question this leaves unanswered is whether it revises how Scottish identity is 
imagined by the majority too, something that points to a gap between the official identity 
of Scotland as a nation and people’s Scottish national identities.   
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
i
 I am grateful to the reviewers and editors for their direction. The research was supported 
by the British Academy and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE).  
ii
 A century earlier, the 1603 union of crowns saw James VI take the throne in England, and with 
it ‘two of the key elements of sovereignty which were the traditional prerogative of the sovereign 
– foreign policy and war.’ (Pittock, 2012: 12). 
iii
 The most recent census told us that nearly 4% or 200,000 of Scotland’s population of more than 
5m consider themselves as minority ethnic. Scottish Asian populations constitute the largest 
visible minorities with just under 50,000 Pakistanis and more than 32,000 Indians.  This is quite 
different from England where in the same year the ethnic minority proportion was 14%. Yet the 
Scottish percentage is double what it was in 2001. By the middle of the century it is expected to 
be approaching 10%. 
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iv
 Flower of Scotland was first employed by Scottish rugby in the early 1970s and Scottish 
football in the 1990s. 
v
 Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/7/contents 
vi
 Which is not to say that they opposed them but that the state should not necessarily be 
supporting them i.e., benign neglect should prevail.   
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